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 Using data from a sample of U.S. industrial facilities 
subject to the federal Clean Air Act from 1993 to 2003, this 
article theorizes and tests the conditions under which 
organizations’ symbolic commitments to self-regulate are 
particularly likely to result in improved compliance 
 practices and outcomes. We argue that the legal environ-
ment, particularly as it is constructed by the enforcement 
activities of regulators, signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uences the likeli-
hood that organizations will effectively implement the 
self-regulatory commitments they symbolically adopt. We 
investigate how different enforcement tools can foster or 
undermine organizations’ normative motivations to 
self-regulate. We ﬁ nd that organizations are more likely to 
follow through on their commitments to self-regulate 
when they (and their competitors) are subject to heavy 
regulatory surveillance and when they adopt self- 
regulation in the absence of an explicit threat of sanctions. 
We also ﬁ nd that historically poor compliers are signiﬁ -
cantly less likely to follow through on their commitments 
to self-regulate, suggesting a substantial limitation on the 
use of self-regulation as a strategy for reforming strug-
gling organizations. Taken together, these ﬁ ndings suggest 
that self-regulation can be a useful tool for leveraging the 
normative motivations of regulated organizations but 
that it cannot replace traditional deterrence-based 
enforcement. •
 The organizational literature has long discussed how the law 
shapes and is shaped by organizations (e.g., Selznick, 1969; 
Edelman, 1990; Sutton et al., 1994; Edelman, Uggen, and 
Erlanger, 1999). More recently, it has described how organiza-
tional behavior can be inﬂ uenced by non-legal interventions 
like social movement activism (Bartley, 2007; King and Soule, 
2007; Reid and Toffel, 2009) and ranking systems (Sauder, 
2008; Sauder and Espeland, 2009; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). 
One common organizational response to these kinds of 
institutional pressures has been to adopt internal compliance 
structures such as grievance procedures (Sutton et al., 1994), 
corporate compliance ofﬁ ces (Edelman, 1992), management 
standards (King and Lenox, 2000; Delmas and Toffel, 2008), 
and codes of conduct (Bartley, 2007) to demonstrate a 
commitment to comply with legal mandates or bring corpo-
rate conduct into line with widely shared normative ideals like 
workplace fairness or environmental sustainability. The 
existing literature provides a rich empirical and theoretical 
account of how and why these kinds of “self-regulatory” 
structures emerge and diffuse broadly across organizational 
ﬁ elds but leaves unanswered the key question of whether 
they actually change organizational behavior to conform to 
legal or normative ideals. 
 This question has become especially pressing as corporate 
internal compliance structures are increasingly integrated into 
twenty-ﬁ rst-century regulatory design. In an era of mounting 
regulatory demands and shrinking regulatory budgets, govern-
ment agencies have encouraged companies to adopt self-
regulatory structures in the hope that they will increase 
compliance and achieve regulatory goals. For instance, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point program reduces inspections of industrial food 
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processors that build systematic safety checks into their 
production routines. The U.S. Occupational Health and Safety 
Agency offers similar beneﬁ ts, through its Voluntary Protec-
tion Program, to companies that institute internal mecha-
nisms to monitor compliance with workers’ health and safety 
regulations. And the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), adopted in 
the wake of major accounting scandals at Enron and World-
Com, relies on public companies to establish systematic 
“internal controls” and periodically certify their efﬁ cacy to 
ensure the accuracy of corporate ﬁ nancial records. Social 
movement activists have similarly encouraged corporations to 
adopt self-regulatory structures in areas in which formal legal 
remedies are weak or nonexistent, like international labor and 
environmental standards (Bartley, 2003; Davis et al., 2008; 
Reid and Toffel, 2009). 
 These kinds of self-regulatory structures are designed to 
create what has been called a “corporate conscience” 
(Selznick, 1992: 352) by integrating normative concerns into 
the decision-making processes and motivational imperatives 
of those in business organizations typically oriented toward 
the instrumental pursuit of proﬁ t. Institutional scholars have 
generated a rich empirical and theoretical literature that 
examines both the promise and fragility of self-regulatory 
structures as instruments for instantiating “insecure or 
precarious values” (Rees, 1988: 10) in corporations. One 
strand of the literature highlights the mechanisms by which 
self-regulatory structures can institutionalize legal norms in 
organizations (Selznick, 1969; Stone, 1975; Dobbin and 
Sutton, 1998). The other focuses on the ways in which 
self-regulatory structures can serve as vehicles for circum-
venting, and even undermining, the core values that animate 
law (Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande, 1993; Edelman, Fuller, 
and Mara-Drita, 2001). Despite their distinct emphases, 
writers in each strand of scholarship recognize that “both 
outcomes occur” (Selznick, 1992: 234), yet neither account 
reveals much about the circumstances under which we might 
expect to see one or the other. In this article, we move 
beyond this fundamental tension in the literature to theorize 
about and empirically test the conditions under which fragile 
commitments to self-regulate are particularly likely to take 
hold. Analyzing data over a 10-year period from U.S. industrial 
facilities subject to the U.S. Clean Air Act, we examine how 
the legal environment, as constructed by the enforcement 
activities of regulators, might promote or inhibit effective 
self-regulation in those ﬁ rms that purport to adopt it. 
 LAW, ORGANIZATIONS, AND SELF-REGULATION 
 In his classic book on corporate responsibility and compliance, 
Stone (1975) argued that the deterrent effect of legal sanc-
tions is insufﬁ cient to prevent harmful corporate behavior and 
promote compliance with law. He suggested that law could 
most effectively shape organizational behavior by generating 
normative commitments through systemic internal controls. 
Since then, regulatory scholars have argued that internal 
compliance structures can align the behavior of corporate 
organizations with law and social expectations (Gunningham 
and Rees, 1997: 364) and can remake the regulated corpora-
tion into a more reﬂ exive (Teubner, 1983; Orts, 1995), 
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 responsive (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), and even 
 democratic (Parker, 2002) institution. 
 As regulatory demands have increased in scope and complex-
ity, organizations have turned to self-regulatory structures 
both to signify and to facilitate compliance. A number of 
studies have documented the rise of internal controls in 
corporations as they sought to comply with the mandates of 
civil rights laws governing the workplace (Edelman, 1990; 
Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande, 1993; Sutton et al., 1994). 
Other research has noted the widespread adoption of self-
regulatory structures to signal, and ostensibly to promote, 
compliance with ﬁ nancial regulation (McCaffrey and Hart, 
1998; Langevoort, 2002; Krawiec, 2003), environmental 
regulation (Coglianese and Nash, 2001a; Lenox and Nash, 
2003), and workplace safety and labor regulation (Lobel, 2005; 
Estlund, 2010). But although it is clear that corporations have 
widely adopted self-regulatory structures, it is not at all clear 
whether these structures have brought about the kind of 
fundamental changes in those organizations that would 
improve legal compliance. 
 Institutional theory has long struggled with this question and 
with the fundamental tensions inherent in using self- 
regulatory structures to instantiate the normative aspirations 
of law and other value systems into the decision-making 
processes of corporate organizations. Institutional theory 
suggests that self-regulatory structures can become institu-
tionalized in organizations that adopt them, generating both a 
real commitment to regulatory compliance and a set of 
practices to support this commitment. But scholars also 
recognize that the symbolic nature of self-regulatory struc-
tures makes them vulnerable to the task-related and efﬁ -
ciency imperatives of business organizations, which may lead 
these organizations to decouple them from practices (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977) or to implement them in ways that distort 
the normative ideals that underlie the law (Edelman, Erlanger, 
and Lande, 1993). Although institutional theory has mapped 
the contested terrain of self-regulation, it has yet to chart the 
way out of this dilemma. 
 Selznick’s (1969) pioneering work illustrated how an organiza-
tion’s adoption of legalistic structures and routines can 
contribute to the development of a “corporate conscience” 
(Selznick, 1992: 352) that builds legal values and constraints 
into corporate practices and decision-making processes. A 
signiﬁ cant body of research has documented the mechanisms 
by which this occurs, including decision-making structures 
and routines that build in consideration of normative concerns 
(Rees, 1988; Orts, 1995; Parker, 2002), empowered constitu-
encies in the organization that have a stake in achieving 
certain normative outcomes (Rees, 1988; Selznick, 1992; 
Parker, 2002), and external normative pressure from either 
government or third-party stakeholders (Ayres and Braith-
waite, 1991; McCaffrey and Hart, 1998; Parker, 2002). In 
addition to having direct effects on organizational decision-
making processes, these kinds of organizational structures 
also generate normative scripts for motivating and justifying 
organizational actions that compete with instrumental 
accounts of the organization’s imperatives and sometimes 
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transform the organization’s understanding of its own instru-
mental interests (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998). In this way, 
self-regulatory structures can institutionalize precarious values 
like legal compliance. 
 A number of studies have demonstrated how internal compli-
ance structures can instantiate commitments in organizations 
as employees become invested in their existence and begin 
to justify them on grounds that are compatible with the 
organization’s task-related imperatives (Edelman, Erlanger, 
and Lande, 1993; Dobbin and Sutton, 1998; Short, 2006). But 
none of these studies has assessed whether the adoption of 
self-regulatory structures actually achieved the normative 
goals toward which they were directed. Moreover, the 
authors have all cautioned that grounding normative justiﬁ ca-
tions for compliance in the structure and efﬁ ciency impera-
tives of organizations might signiﬁ cantly limit the meaning and 
impact of law on organizational behavior. 
 It is precisely these limits that dominate a second strand of 
institutional scholarship on internal compliance structures. 
This literature highlights the symbolic nature of self-regulatory 
structures and the ways in which they allow the task-related 
and efﬁ ciency imperatives of organizations to overwhelm and 
distort the normative ideals that underlie law. So, for instance, 
even as Edelman (1992: 1544) documented the widespread 
adoption of Equal Employment Opportunity and Afﬁ rmative 
Action policies and ofﬁ ces, she stressed that these formal 
structures “do not commit organizations to a particular type 
or degree of compliance,” observing that many corporate 
adopters create these structures “as substitutes for compli-
ance, as shams.” Krawiec (2003: 491, 577) similarly charac-
terized internal compliance structures as “window-dressing,” 
arguing that the structure of corporate legal liability gives 
organizations “an incentive to invest in low-cost, potentially 
ineffective internal policing measures that fail to reduce 
organizational misconduct.” 
 Qualitative studies of internal compliance structures have 
further articulated the limits of self-regulation, suggesting 
that they are not merely harmless window-dressing, decou-
pled from practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) but, instead, 
have the potential to undermine the values that animate the 
law. Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande (1993: 497) demon-
strated, for example, that the corporate employees who 
staff internal compliance programs designed to remedy 
workplace discrimination “tend to subsume legal rights 
under managerial interests.” Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 
(2001: 1632) similarly documented how internal compliance 
structures “undermine law’s moral commitment to redress-
ing historical wrongs” as they get interpreted through the 
lens of managerial interests and imperatives. Bisom-Rapp 
(1999) argued that internal compliance structures that 
operate in this manner mask ongoing discrimination both by 
making organizations appear compliant and by generating 
documentary evidence of the organization’s nondiscrimina-
tory intent that can be used to counter charges of discrimi-
nation. In this way, self-regulatory structures render the 
reality of ongoing workplace discrimination more difﬁ cult to 
perceive and to prove. 
Self-Regulation
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 A substantial body of empirical literature evaluating voluntary 
regulation initiatives suggests that this skepticism is not 
unwarranted. Recent meta-analyses of self-regulation pro-
grams have concluded that participating companies perform 
no better (and sometimes perform worse) than their non-self-
regulating counterparts (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007; Darnall and 
Sides, 2008). Despite the concerns they raise, scholars in this 
strand of literature recognize the potential of self-regulatory 
structures to proliferate and to support the realization of legal 
and normative ideals. For instance, Edelman (1990) discussed 
the possibility that the institutionalization of the normative 
ideals underlying particular laws might amplify their inﬂ uence 
on organizations. And Edelman and Petterson (1999) showed 
that even when symbolically adopted self-regulatory struc-
tures do not themselves achieve legal or normative goals, 
they can prompt organizations to adopt more specialized 
structures that have had some success at achieving 
those ends. 
 These accounts provide important insights into the complex 
mechanisms by which self-regulatory structures shape and 
are shaped by adopting organizations and the tensions 
inherent in organizational self-regulation. But although the 
literature provides a rich framework for analysis, it tells us 
little about whether and under what circumstances self- 
regulatory structures will facilitate or undermine organizations’ 
adherence to legal norms. Internal compliance structures 
have been established across a wide array of organizations 
operating in different environmental contexts, yet we know 
little about how such variation might affect their ability to 
shape organizational behavior. As a recent review of this 
literature noted, “scholarship on new regulatory forms has 
produced far more empirical research on their rise and 
character than on their translation into practice” (Schneiberg 
and Bartley, 2008: 50). To move beyond these tensions in the 
literature, we shift the analysis away from the self-regulatory 
structures and focus instead on the legal environment of the 
organizations that adopt them. Speciﬁ cally, we investigate 
how the enforcement activities of regulators construct the 
legal environment in ways that may be more or less condu-
cive to self-regulation. 
 Much like the institutional literature on self-regulatory struc-
tures, scholarship on regulatory enforcement has long recog-
nized that organizations have multiple and potentially 
conﬂ icting motivations for complying or not complying with 
law as well as for self-regulating or cooperating with regula-
tors (Braithwaite, 1985; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Winter 
and May, 2001). On the one hand, organizations can be 
“amoral calculators” (Kagan and Scholz, 1984), maximizing 
their payoffs by breaking the law or breaking their symbolic 
commitments whenever the beneﬁ ts of doing so exceed the 
anticipated costs of getting caught. On the other hand, 
organizations and their individual members are also motivated 
by a complex set of normative concerns. Organizations might 
comply with the law to demonstrate their legitimacy (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Edelman and 
Suchman, 1997), because they have come to see compliance 
as integral to their corporate culture or identity (Selznick, 
1969; Howard-Grenville, Nash, and Coglianese, 2008), or 
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simply because individuals within the organization believe it is 
the right thing to do (Morrison, 1991; Coglianese and Nash, 
2001a; Gunningham, Thornton, and Kagan, 2005; Tyler, 
Callahan, and Frost, 2007). Successful regulatory design must 
recognize and engage these diverse motivations (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Parker, 2006). 
 Successful self-regulation likewise results from a complex set 
of motivations. Research has shown that organizations will 
not reliably self-regulate without the pressure of deterrence 
(Rees, 1988; Sigler and Murphy, 1988; Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1991; McCaffrey and Hart, 1998; Parker, 2002; Short and 
Toffel, 2008). At the same time, and by deﬁ nition, meaningful 
self-regulation requires a certain amount of intrinsic organiza-
tional motivation. To theorize about the appropriate balance 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators for compliance 
outcomes, we draw on organizational scholarship on social 
control and cooperative behavior. Although it largely 
addresses the internal dynamics of organizations, this litera-
ture provides a rich theoretical framework for analyzing 
voluntary regulatory strategies that seek to secure the 
cooperation of regulated entities within the context of a 
coercive regulatory regime. The key insight is that, although 
enforcement tools like sanctions and surveillance can be 
effective means of social control (Sewell, 1998), they can also 
undermine intrinsic motivations to cooperate with others 
(Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Malhotra and Murnighan, 
2002) or execute certain tasks (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 
1999). Below, we investigate how different tools in the 
enforcement portfolio, like regulatory threats and surveillance, 
may affect efforts to mobilize internal compliance structures 
and promote self-regulation. 
 Mobilizing Internal Compliance Structures 
 The mobilization of internal compliance structures emerged 
as a regulatory strategy in the 1990s in response to a variety 
of institutional factors. A 1991 revision to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations (Section 8B2.1) that 
granted leniency to ﬁ rms with effective internal compliance 
programs spurred the broad adoption of such programs 
(Goldsmith and King, 1997; Krawiec, 2003). In the years that 
followed, regulators found ways to expand and make use of 
these structures. The regulatory “reinvention” initiatives of 
the Clinton administration encouraged regulators and regu-
lated entities to experiment with self-regulation as a way to 
move “beyond compliance” to achieve regulatory goals over 
and above what the law required (Murray, 1999; Gardner, 
2003). In addition, an increasing antipathy toward “command-
and-control” regulation prompted a search for more coopera-
tive ways of regulating that relied on the voluntary efforts of 
regulated ﬁ rms (Short, 2009). Taken together, these condi-
tions increased the pressure on regulated companies to 
adopt, or at least represent that they had adopted, systematic 
internal compliance structures. 
 In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
launched one of the ﬁ rst government programs speciﬁ cally 
designed to instantiate practices of systematic, internal 
auditing into the compliance routines of regulated entities. 
Self-Regulation
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“Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Correction and 
Prevention of Violations,” commonly referred to as the Audit 
Policy, is a penalty mitigation program that reduces or waives 
certain penalties for environmental compliance violations that 
are voluntarily reported to the government by regulated 
entities. But, as its title suggests, the program has much 
broader ambitions. The Audit Policy is designed not merely to 
identify undiscovered violations by getting facilities to report 
on themselves. Its primary objective is to encourage facilities 
to establish and maintain “systematic, objective, and peri-
odic” procedures for policing themselves ( Federal Register , 
1995: 66708). In fact, the U.S. EPA has expressed the hope 
that such procedures would become institutionalized in 
regulated organizations, rendering “formal EPA investigation 
and enforcement action unnecessary” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2005). 
 The Audit Policy seeks to encourage adoption of internal 
compliance structures by conditioning the program’s penalty 
mitigation beneﬁ ts on a number of criteria, including, most 
critically, the discloser’s representation of past and future 
internal compliance auditing practices. Like more traditional 
amnesty/disclosure programs, such as the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services’ “Provider Self-Disclosure 
Protocol” and the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Corporate 
Leniency Program,” the Audit Policy requires prompt and 
voluntary disclosure (within 21 days of discovery) and reme-
diation of the violation within 60 calendar days (U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 2007). What distinguishes the 
Audit Policy is its insistence that voluntary disclosures arise 
from the “systematic discovery of the violation through an 
environmental audit or a compliance management system” 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000: 19618). Thus it 
is not simply an amnesty program for one-off discoveries of 
regulatory violations. The Audit Policy further requires a 
would-be voluntary discloser to make assurances that it will 
“prevent a recurrence of the violation” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2000: 19622). Accordingly, a voluntary 
disclosure under the Audit Policy is meant to be taken as a 
representation that the discloser has not only adopted formal 
internal compliance procedures but that it has also committed 
to maintaining them in the future to prevent subsequent 
violations. 
 Voluntary disclosures thus indicate organizations’ commit-
ments to self-regulate, but different institutional conditions 
will inﬂ uence organizations’ ability to implement those 
commitments. The nature and amount of regulatory pressure 
as well as organizations’ experience navigating their regula-
tory environments can inﬂ uence the likelihood that regulated 
organizations will follow through on commitments to self-
regulate. Threats, surveillance, and experience can each 
moderate the efﬁ cacy of organizational self-regulation. 
 Effect of Regulatory Threats on Commitments 
to Self-Regulate 
 Although all disclosures made under the Audit Policy are 
voluntary in the sense that they are not legally required, the 
EPA sometimes applies the policy against the backdrop of an 
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explicit enforcement threat. EPA-sponsored Compliance 
Incentive Programs, for example, target particular industries 
or regulated activities for heightened enforcement scrutiny. In 
these programs, the agency notiﬁ es a group of facilities of its 
concern about possible non-compliance with a speciﬁ c set of 
regulatory requirements. The EPA speciﬁ es the relevant 
requirements, describes what must be done to come into 
compliance, and establishes a time period during which 
compliance violations may be disclosed and remedied. For 
companies that disclose violations and commit to ongoing 
internal compliance auditing, the penalty is waived or greatly 
reduced. At the same time, most Compliance Incentive 
Program letters and announcements contain explicit enforce-
ment threats, for instance, that “companies that do not take 
advantage of this limited time offer face a greater risk of 
future inspections” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2009) or that failure to report and ﬁ x violations “could result in 
an enforcement action, including a ﬁ ne” (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2002a). Though these programs have 
been quite effective at prompting companies to disclose 
targeted violations to the EPA under the Audit Policy and 
remediate them (Short and Toffel, 2008), it is unclear whether 
companies disclosing under these conditions have imple-
mented their accompanying pledge to engage in internal 
compliance auditing. 
 Meaningful self-regulation, like other forms of cooperative 
behavior, is driven by a complex mix of internal, external, and 
reputational motivations (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Numer-
ous studies have demonstrated the importance of external 
motivators like regulatory enforcement and punitive sanctions 
in prompting regulated organizations not only to comply with 
law but to regulate themselves. Regulatory penalties can 
promote formal compliance with legal requirements (Gunning-
ham, Thornton, and Kagan, 2005; Mendelhoff and Gray, 2005; 
Shimshack and Ward, 2005). Punitive enforcement can also 
motivate organizations to adopt self-regulatory structures and 
policies, at least symbolically (Edelman, 1992; Sutton et al., 
1994; Short and Toffel, 2008). In addition, punitive enforce-
ment, or at least the possibility of it, appears to be essential 
to the ultimate success of regulatory schemes that incorpo-
rate self-regulation. Research has shown that self-regulatory 
initiatives tend to fail in the absence of external deterrence 
pressures like the possibility of sanctions (Ayres and Braith-
waite, 1991; McCaffrey and Hart, 1998; King and Lenox, 
2000; Parker, 2002; Short and Toffel, 2008). 
 Nevertheless, the regulatory compliance literature has long 
recognized that punitive enforcement is a double-edged 
sword that can compromise goodwill and actors’ intrinsic 
and reputational motivations to comply with the law and 
cooperate with regulators (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). 
Penalties administered by regulators in a particularly punitive 
or adversarial style may produce a backlash of resistance 
and recalcitrance in the regulated community (Bardach and 
Kagan, 1982; Kagan, 2001; Winter and May, 2001). Punitive 
enforcement can also destroy the reputational beneﬁ ts ﬁ rms 
get for good compliance behavior, undermining a key 
motivation for self-regulation (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 
Self-Regulation
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2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2006). Benabou and Tirole (2006: 
1654) suggested that individuals often engage in altruistic or 
cooperative behavior to enhance their stature with others, 
but extrinsic incentives undermine the symbolic value of 
good behavior, “creating doubt about the extent to which 
[good deeds] were performed for the incentives rather than 
for themselves.” 
 Numerous studies on motivating cooperation in organiza-
tions have demonstrated that intrinsic motivations are 
fragile and can be crowded out by attempts to manipulate 
behavior extrinsically using sanctions or rewards. For 
instance, Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999: 688) demon-
strated that punitive sanctions blunt ethical or 
 commitment-based motivations for cooperation and render 
the decision to cooperate as one “mainly about averting 
penalties or achieving rewards.” Similarly, Malhotra and 
Murnighan (2002: 538) showed that binding contracts can 
undermine trust between transacting parties because each 
party attributes the other’s cooperative behavior to legal 
coercion “rather than to each other’s fair or noble 
motives.” As a whole, this literature suggests that “the 
greater the external pressure or inducement for individuals 
performing acts consistent with their beliefs, the less 
committed they are to the act” (Howell and Higgins, 1990: 
338). Notably, sanctions need not actually be imposed to 
produce these effects; “the explicit threat of punishment” 
(Fehr and Gachter, 2001) is sufﬁ cient to undermine intrinsic 
motivations. 
 Although we know of no empirical studies that explicitly 
address the relationship between punitive enforcement 
and organizational self-regulation, existing research 
strongly suggests that coercive pressure can undermine 
the self- regulatory commitments of organizations. Dobbin 
and  Sutton’s (1998) classic argument about the “strength 
of a weak state” asserts that it is the largely voluntary 
character of legal compliance that gives U.S. regulation its 
normative bite, as organizations develop durable and 
normatively justiﬁ ed commitments to the self-regulatory 
structures they adopt. Bartley (2007) similarly argued that 
voluntary forest certiﬁ cation programs have gained more 
credibility and legitimacy than voluntary labor standards 
certiﬁ cation programs, in part because the forest certiﬁ ca-
tion system was inspired and supported by an internal 
constituency of eco-conscious woodworkers, while labor 
standards were adopted solely to fend off the external 
threat of boycotts. 
 Even though self-regulation cannot be separated from the 
extrinsic motivations that prompt and support it, its efﬁ cacy 
depends heavily on the intrinsic and reputational motivations 
of the ﬁ rms that adopt it. Consequently, although the EPA 
might be able to achieve greater symbolic adoption of self-
regulatory procedures through coercive tactics (Short and 
Toffel, 2008), companies that issue such “coerced confes-
sions” will be unlikely to implement effectively the accompa-
nying internal compliance auditing practices. We posit that 
facilities that self-disclose a violation and commit to ongoing 
self-policing without a direct regulatory threat are particularly 
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likely to follow through on the commitment and that this 
should improve their compliance records: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1) :  Among facilities that are not facing a direct 
regulatory threat, those that commit to adopting internal compliance 
auditing will improve regulatory compliance outcomes. 
 Effect of Regulatory Surveillance on Commitments 
to Self-Regulate 
 Surveillance, like punitive sanctions, can be an effective tool 
of social control (Sewell, 1998). Numerous studies have 
shown that more heavily monitored facilities are better 
compliers than their less monitored peers (Magat and Viscusi, 
1990; Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; Kuperan and Sutinen, 
1998; Gray and Shadbegian, 2005), but little is known about 
how surveillance affects organizational motivations to self-
regulate. From the perspective of deterrence theory, an 
economic model that posits ﬁ rms as rational actors that will 
comply with law only to the extent that the costs of doing so 
are less than the potential beneﬁ ts of noncompliance, threat-
ening to inspect (and possibly punish) a facility, as the EPA 
does in its Compliance Incentive Programs, is no different 
than conducting routine inspections that might or might not 
result in punishment. Both enforcement tools are merely 
ways to inﬂ uence the regulated organization’s expected 
costs, and both are “coercive” in the sense that they seek to 
induce particular behaviors by making undesirable behavior 
more costly. The organizational literature on sanctions and 
surveillance likewise sees the two as largely synonymous 
(e.g., Zald, 1978). Sewell (1998: 397), for instance, argued 
that, like sanctions, surveillance “tends to convey negative 
images of suspicion, distrust, and disobedience.” However, 
despite apparent similarities between regulatory surveillance 
and punishment threats, there are reasons to believe that 
greater surveillance will more effectively motivate regulated 
organizations to make good on their pledges to self-regulate. 
 In the regulatory context, two key distinctions between threats 
and surveillance affect the way they moderate the self-regula-
tory behavior of organizations. The ﬁ rst is their effect on 
internal compliance constituencies. Effective compliance 
groups tend to develop a distinctive culture, somewhat 
removed from the rest of the ﬁ rm (Langevoort, 2002), in which 
they “see themselves as pursuing a higher calling” (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992: 24). Threatening to punish the organization 
for compliance lapses assumes instead that they are driven by 
less honorable motivations, which “insults them, demotivates 
them” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 24–25). In addition, 
regulatory penalties levied against an organization may prompt 
management to sanction its compliance personnel, further 
diminishing their morale and motivation. Surveillance, by 
contrast, can bolster compliance constituencies. Compliance 
personnel gain status and voice in the organization when the 
regulator comes around (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). One of 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992: 33) interview subjects, a 
compliance administrator in a nursing home, explained that 
managers are much more responsive to compliance concerns 
when they are anticipating inspectors’ visits: “It helps us. 
Without them we’d have no power with the proprietor.” In this 
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way, surveillance can lend “authoritative support to law-abiding 
constituencies within the organization” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992: 33), bolstering a pillar of effective self-regulation. 
 Second, routine inspections lack the “cuing” or “framing” 
effect of actual sanctions or direct threats. Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999) demonstrated that framing an enforcement 
measure in a way that highlights rewards and punishments 
undermines the intrinsic motivation to cooperate, reframing 
the situation from one “infused with ethical and moral 
considerations, at least for some people, to one in which the 
choice is mainly about averting penalties or achieving 
rewards” (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999: 687–688). Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2000) reached a similar conclusion in their 
study of parents’ late pick-ups of their children from daycare 
centers. They found that when the daycare centers intro-
duced a ﬁ ne for late pick-ups, the practice increased rather 
than decreased. They explained this counterintuitive result by 
arguing that the threat of a ﬁ ne reframed the decision to pick 
up on time from a moral choice focused on how much to 
impose on the caregivers’ generosity to a calculative one 
focused on how much the parent was willing to pay to 
purchase after-hours care. 
 Compliance Incentive Programs are explicitly designed to have 
a strong framing effect. They focus the attention of particular 
regulated entities on speciﬁ c regulatory violations and on the 
penalties they will incur if the violations are not corrected. By 
contrast, routine regulatory inspections, although attended by 
the same negative possibilities, do not frame the situation in 
these terms and so should not necessarily dampen intrinsic 
motivations for compliance or for self-regulation. A number of 
studies have, in fact, demonstrated that surveillance is central 
to the meaningful implementation of an organization’s sym-
bolic commitments. Studies have shown that decoupling is 
more likely when scrutiny is low, including situations in which 
there is no enforcement (Edelman, 1992), “when there is no 
ofﬁ ce or expert to monitor progress” (Kalev, Kelly, and Dobbin, 
2006: 592), or when adopters can hide their internal operations 
from external constituents (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 
1997). Self-regulatory structures have been shown consis-
tently to improve regulatory compliance and performance 
outcomes only when they are supported by third-party moni-
toring (e.g., Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Weil, 2005; Toffel, 
2006). A recent review of the literature on corporate social 
responsibility also reported a strong consensus among 
researchers that stakeholder monitoring is a key ingredient in 
responsible corporate behavior, including effective corporate 
self-regulation (Campbell, 2007). For these reasons, we expect 
regulatory surveillance to promote meaningful implementation 
of self-regulation commitments: 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  Among heavily monitored facilities, those 
that commit to adopting internal compliance auditing will improve 
 regulatory compliance outcomes. 
 Prior research has found that organizations sometimes 
respond differently to enforcement pressures affecting all 
organizations in their institutional ﬁ eld than to enforcement 
pressures aimed directly at them (e.g., Hirsch, 2009). Hence, 
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ﬁ eld-level as well as facility-level surveillance may moderate 
the implementation of self-regulation commitments. Intense 
ﬁ eld-level surveillance should be an effective tool for promot-
ing implementation of self-regulation in individual organiza-
tions because it sends a strong normative message about 
expectations in the ﬁ eld, without the cuing effect described 
above (Gunningham and Rees, 1997; Hirsch, 2009). More 
intensive industrywide surveillance also signals to would-be 
self-regulators that their competitors are being watched too, 
providing greater assurance that investments in compliance 
will not disadvantage them vis-à-vis their competitors 
( Gunningham and Rees, 1997). 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  Within heavily monitored industries, facilities 
that commit to adopting internal compliance auditing will improve 
regulatory compliance outcomes. 
 Effect of Experience on Commitments to Self-Regulate 
 Regulated organizations’ experiences in navigating their legal 
environments also inﬂ uence the way they approach the 
commitment to self-regulate. Some will have been exemplary 
compliers, while others will have had more difﬁ culty comply-
ing with regulatory demands. An organization’s compliance 
experience is likely to be reﬂ ected in its compliance routines. 
Routines have been characterized as the “memory of an 
organization” (Cyert and March, 1963: 101), structural arti-
facts that “encode organizational capabilities and knowledge” 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 98) accumulated through 
experience. The existence of good or poor routines may also 
drive, rather than merely reﬂ ect, good or poor compliance 
experience. Successful implementation of a commitment to 
self-regulate largely depends on the presence of self-regula-
tory routines, such as internal compliance auditing, designed 
to enhance the organization’s capacity to comply with its legal 
obligations. One factor that may moderate the ability to 
implement self-regulatory routines is the extent to which they 
complement or conﬂ ict with an organization’s existing compli-
ance routines. 
 It is much easier to implement routines that are compatible 
with longstanding practices and understandings than to 
implement routines that go against the grain of existing 
practices. Organizational routines typically exert “strong 
inertial forces” (Haveman, 1992: 49) on organizational prac-
tices by providing scripts that encode behavior (March and 
Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) and generating mean-
ings through which employees understand these behaviors 
(Feldman, 2003). Although routines can be a source of 
dynamism under certain conditions (Haveman, 1992; Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003; Howard-Grenville, 2005), organizations 
are resistant to change when managers attempt to impose 
new routines from above (Feldman, 2003) or when the new 
routines are not a logical outgrowth of existing routines (Have-
man, 1992). For instance, Marcus (1988) demonstrated that 
companies’ past compliance routines locked them into 
“beneﬁ cent” or “vicious” cycles that constrained safety 
managers’ ability to implement new regulatory demands 
ﬂ exibly and effectively. Feldman (2003) found that it is 
particularly difﬁ cult for managers to change existing routines 
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intentionally by prescribing new ones, because employees 
attach meanings to the existing routines that may be incom-
patible with behaviors necessary to implement the new ones. 
Kalev, Kelly, and Dobbin (2006: 591–592) similarly observed 
that workers often ignore the new routines that managers 
attempt to impose on them, perhaps “because individuals 
face information overload, and thus stick to the familiar, or 
because the old ways of doing things have been imbued with 
meaning and value over time.” Because a new routine is 
particularly likely to be successfully implemented when it 
builds on established routines and competences (Haveman, 
1992), organizations with superior compliance experience 
should be well poised to successfully implement their 
 commitments to self-regulate. 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4) :  Among facilities with superior compliance expe-
rience, those that commit to adopting internal compliance auditing 
will be more likely to preserve their superior regulatory compliance 
outcomes. 
 METHOD 
 Context and Sample 
 The Audit Policy provides an ideal empirical context in which 
to investigate the connection between symbolic adoption of 
self-regulatory structures and regulatory outcomes. First, the 
program has generated an extensive dataset on companies’ 
representations of having adopted internal compliance 
auditing procedures. Second, the Audit Policy is embedded in 
an inspection-based regulatory regime that generates data on 
outcomes for both organizations that identify themselves as 
self-regulators and those that do not, enabling us to compare 
their compliance performance. This kind of data would be 
impossible to replicate in a claims-based regulatory scheme 
like that governing employment discrimination, in which 
violations depend on plaintiffs’ highly contingent ability to 
mobilize and vindicate their legal rights, and where the claims 
that do arise are often settled conﬁ dentially, rendering 
signiﬁ cant aspects of the enforcement scheme invisible to 
researchers. Our research setting enables us to overcome the 
“difﬁ culty of observing decoupling of organizational practices 
across large samples of organizations” (Westphal and Zajac, 
2001: 202). In this way, our ﬁ ndings help to develop a more 
general framework for understanding the possibilities and 
limitations of institutionalizing self-regulatory structures within 
organizations. 
 We tested our hypotheses on a sample of industrial facilities 
located across the United States that are subject to the 
federal Clean Air Act (CAA) ( United States Code , Title 42, 
Chapter 85, 2008), which applies to a wide range of indus-
tries and activities that emit air pollutants beyond regulatory 
thresholds. Our sample period extends from 1993, two 
years before the Audit Policy was launched, through 2003. 
The CAA gives the U.S. EPA broad authority to set limits on 
air pollutants emitted by both stationary sources such as 
chemical plants, utilities, and steel mills and mobile sources 
such as automobiles and trucks. The facilities in our sample 
are all regulated under the stationary source provisions of 
the CAA. 
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 The Clean Air Act provides the U.S. EPA with broad enforce-
ment powers to inspect regulated facilities and seek adminis-
trative, civil, and criminal penalties for noncompliance. CAA 
inspections entail “visits to a facility . . . for the purpose of 
gathering information to determine whether it is in compli-
ance,” which may include “interviewing facility or site repre-
sentatives, reviewing records and reports, taking 
photographs, collecting samples, and observing facility or site 
operations” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). 
The federal CAA delegates signiﬁ cant enforcement authority 
to the states, such that both the federal EPA and state 
environmental regulators conduct CAA inspections, and our 
dataset includes all of these inspections. Regulators target 
CAA inspections and establish enforcement priorities based 
on a number of factors, including patterns of noncompliance 
and the signiﬁ cance of the environmental and health risks 
associated with speciﬁ c pollutants or industrial activities (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2002b). Major enforcement 
initiatives during our sample period, 1993–2003, have tar-
geted petroleum reﬁ neries, coal-ﬁ red power plants, pulp mills, 
and mining facilities. 
 Violations of the CAA can take a number of forms, including 
“violating performance standards, violating emissions stan-
dards, releasing hazardous air pollutants in disregard of 
emission standards, making false statements in required 
documents, and tampering with required monitoring devices” 
(Scalia, 1999: 9). Facilities regulated under the CAA are also 
commonly cited for failing to plan for and manage hazardous 
air pollutants according to the terms of their operating permits 
(Stretesky and Gabriel, 2005: 874–875). Depending on the 
severity of the violation and its enforcement priorities, the 
EPA may seek to correct and/or punish the violation through a 
variety of enforcement vehicles, including ﬁ eld citations 
issued on site by inspectors, administrative penalties and 
orders adjudicated by the agency, judicially imposed civil 
penalties, monetary and injunctive relief, and criminal penal-
ties, including ﬁ nes and imprisonment (Reitze and Hoffman, 
1994: 740). 
 The stringency of CAA enforcement has varied over the 
period of our study. For instance, the number of judicial 
enforcement actions and the amount of civil and criminal 
penalties collected rose throughout most of the 1990s, then 
began to decline in the late 1990s and continued to do so 
through the end of our study period. In FY 1993, the U.S. 
EPA made 80 civil judicial referrals under the CAA. That 
ﬁ gure ﬂ uctuated greatly but remained greater than 80 for 
four out of six years between FY 1993 and FY 1998, when it 
stood at 113. From FY 1998 to FY 2003, the ﬁ gure never 
rose above 80, ﬂ uctuating between 79 and 49 referrals (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008a: E-2b). The number 
of criminal enforcement ﬁ nes and penalties also rose, from 
$44 million in FY 1993 to a high of $227 million in FY 1997, 
then gradually declined to $83 million in FY 2003 (all ﬁ gures 
in adjusted FY 2008 dollars) (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2008b: E-3). The number of citizen suits seeking to 
enforce environmental laws also declined over the same 
time period, from a high of 29 in 1998 to 18 in 2002 (May, 
2003: 10718, table 13). 
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 To test our hypotheses, we developed a matched sample of 
facilities that disclosed violations of the CAA and other 
environmental statutes under the Audit Policy and facilities 
that were otherwise similar but did not disclose any violations 
under the Audit Policy. The primary empirical approaches to 
facilitating causal inference include modeling selection bias 
using instrumental variables and developing a matched 
sample (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). Unable to 
identify a convincing instrumental variable, we developed a 
matched sample in an attempt to identify a subset of disclos-
ing and non-disclosing facilities that were otherwise as similar 
as possible. Speciﬁ cally, our matching approach sought to 
identify a matched sample comprising facilities that disclosed 
violations of environmental statutes under the Audit Policy 
and facilities that were otherwise similar but did not disclose 
any violations under the Audit Policy. 
 Our empirical model estimated the extent to which inspec-
tions at facilities that disclosed violations under the Audit 
Policy, and thereby purported to adopt self-regulation, were 
subsequently more likely to yield no violations. We compared 
the compliance records of disclosing facilities before and after 
disclosing with the compliance records of facilities that did 
not make such representations over the same time period. 
This difference-in-differences approach relies on an identifying 
assumption that, had they not participated in the Audit Policy, 
the trend in disclosers’ outcomes during the post-disclosure 
period would have been indistinguishable from that of non-
disclosers. Prior empirical research has demonstrated, 
however, that self-disclosing violations under the Audit Policy 
is more likely to occur among facilities that face greater 
regulatory pressure (Short and Toffel, 2008), which suggests 
that self-disclosers might differ in important ways from the 
entire population of non-disclosers. 
 To bolster the plausibility of the identifying assumption, we 
compared disclosing facilities to a matched set of non- 
disclosers that looked similar to them in the years prior to 
disclosure. The logic was that a matched group of disclosers 
and non-disclosers that appear similar before disclosure 
would continue to appear similar over the ensuing years, 
were there no disclosures. In developing a matched sample, 
we sought to replicate a randomized experiment that com-
pares “treated” with “controls” that do not differ systemati-
cally from each other at the time the treatment, in our case 
disclosure, occurs (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). 
Estimating treatment effects by constructing a matched 
control group and analyzing panel data using a difference-
in-differences approach is a robust approach (Smith and Todd, 
2005) that has been used in many recent program evaluations 
(e.g., Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; 
Galiani, Gertler, and  Schargrodsky, 2005; Qian, 2007). 
 To develop our matched sample, we implemented case- 
control matching based on seven criteria that prior research 
has revealed to be associated with facilities’ decisions 
whether to disclose violations under the Audit Policy (Short 
and Toffel, 2008). We considered each discloser’s 3-digit 
Standard Industry Classiﬁ cation (SIC) industry code. We also 
included each facility’s record of annual inspections, 
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 violations, and enforcement actions, in each case considering 
the values one year and two years before it disclosed to the 
Audit Policy. We included as the disclosers’ matched controls 
non-disclosing facilities that matched exactly on these seven 
dimensions. We designated the former’s disclosure year as 
the “match year” for this matched group of facilities and 
repeated this process for all self-disclosers. Our analysis 
included each matched facility’s observations starting two 
years before and extending ﬁ ve years after the match year. 
This resulted in a matched sample of 7,274 facilities including 
373 adopters and 6,901 non-adopters. Column 1 of table1 
tabulates these facilities by industry. 
 Because conditional ﬁ xed effects logistic regression models 
are only identiﬁ ed for facilities in which the dependent 
variable varies during the sample period, our regression 
models are only identiﬁ ed for facilities that experienced at 
least one inspection that yielded a violation and at least one 
inspection that yielded no violations. These restrictions 
resulted in a matched sample of 832 facilities (6,150 facility-
year observations) including 64 facilities (724 facility-year 
observations) that disclosed violations and committed to 
self-policing. Column 2 of table 1 reports a tabulation of these 
facilities by industry. Note that the distributions of facilities 
across industries in columns 1 and 2 are similar. For example, 
Table 1
Industry Composition of Sample
SIC Code and Industrial Sector
Entire Matched Sample 
(N = 7,274 facilities)
Matched Facilities 
with Variation in 
Inspection Outcomes 
(N = 832 facilities)*
Facilities Percent Facilities Percent
13 Oil and gas extraction 109 1% 14 2%
14 Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic 
minerals, except fuels
116 2% 22 3%
20 Food and kindred products 588 8% 52 6%
22 Textile mill products 121 2% 14 2%
24 Lumber and wood products, except furniture 381 5% 33 4%
26 Paper and allied products 140 2% 15 2%
27 Printing, publishing, and allied industries 164 2% 9 1%
28 Chemicals and allied products 914 13% 141 17%
29 Petroleum reﬁ ning and related industries 325 4% 32 4%
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 373 5% 67 8%
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 336 5% 31 4%
33 Primary metal industries 488 7% 57 7%
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and transportation equipment
987 14% 145 17%
35 Industrial and commercial machinery 
and computer equipment
168 2% 12 1%
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and 
components, except computer equipment
179 2% 9 1%
37 Transportation equipment 299 4% 32 4%
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 573 8% 58 7%
80 Health services 242 3% 28 3%
Other industries 771 11% 61 7%
* This is the subset of the matched sample of facilities with variation in inspection outcomes and was therefore 
 estimated via the primary conditional ﬁ xed effect logistic regression models.
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both samples are distributed across many industries, 
 chemicals and allied products (SIC 28) and fabricated metal 
products (SIC 34) being the most highly represented in both 
the entire matched sample and the subset identiﬁ ed in the 
conditional ﬁ xed effects logistic regression models. 
 Measures 
 When an organization disclosed regulatory violations under 
the Audit Policy, it nominally committed to implement internal 
policies to monitor its regulatory compliance. To assess 
whether organizations followed through on this commitment, 
we focused our analysis on regulatory outcomes, for two 
reasons. First, because of the information asymmetry within 
our empirical context, we (like regulators) could not directly 
observe facilities’ actual audit practices. Second, the EPA and 
other regulatory agencies explicitly encouraged regulated 
entities to engage in internal auditing for the very purpose of 
improving compliance outcomes. Outcome measures 
employed in prior studies of compliance with environmental 
as well as occupational health and safety regulation have 
been either self-reported by regulated entities (Magat and 
Viscusi, 1990; Gray and Scholz, 1991; Earnhart, 2004; 
 Mendelhoff and Gray, 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 2005) or 
recorded by agency inspectors (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; 
Gray and Scholz, 1993; U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁ ce, 2001; 
Gray and Shadbegian, 2005). Because we sought to assess 
organizations’ self-policing efforts, we relied on regulatory 
compliance records created by regulatory inspectors. We 
created  clean inspection as a dichotomous variable based on 
a facility’s regulatory inspection on a given date, coded 1 
when the inspection resulted in no compliance violations (i.e., 
was “clean”) and coded 0 when the inspector cited the 
facility for one or more violations. This distinction between 
whether or not inspections resulted in violations has been 
used in other empirical analyses of regulatory compliance 
(e.g., Gray and Scholz, 1993; U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁ ce, 
2001). We obtained data on CAA regulatory inspections and 
violations from the U.S. EPA’s Aerometric Information 
Retrieval System (AIRS)/AIRS Facility Subsystem database. 
 The primary independent variable in our analysis is  disclosed , 
a dichotomous variable coded 1 in the years after a facility 
disclosed one or more regulatory violations under the U.S. 
EPA Audit Policy and formally committed to self-regulate, and 
0 beforehand. This variable was always coded 0 for facilities 
that never disclosed violations under the Audit Policy. We 
obtained data on violations disclosed to the Audit Policy from 
three sources: (1) the U.S. EPA Integrated Compliance 
Information System (ICIS) database, (2) the U.S. EPA Audit 
Policy Docket, and (3) lists of participants in various EPA 
Compliance Incentive Programs. The U.S. EPA provided these 
datasets in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. 
 We gathered data to control for several other factors that 
have been shown to inﬂ uence compliance. Prior research has 
indicated that a facility’s current compliance behavior can be 
affected by its recent regulatory experience (Magat and 
Viscusi, 1990; Gray and Deily, 1996; Helland, 1998; Gunning-
ham, Thornton, and Kagan, 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 
378/ASQ, September 2010
2005). In addition, when considering which facilities to target 
for inspection, the EPA takes into account facilities’ compli-
ance and enforcement histories (U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 1999), and facility managers’ perceived likelihood 
of being inspected can inﬂ uence their compliance behavior 
(Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Shimshack and Ward, 2005). 
We thus calculated each facility’s  annual number of CAA 
violations in each of the prior two years, which we top coded 
at the 99th percentile (3 violations) to reduce the impact of 
outliers. The results of our models were virtually identical 
when we replaced these two top-coded violation counts with 
either the annual violation counts (not top-coded) or the log of 
the annual violation counts (taken after adding 1). Because 
regulators might attempt to ensure that they return to inspect 
a facility before a certain time elapses (and in some cases 
face legal minimum requirements regarding how often they 
must return to particular facilities), we measured the  number 
of years since the facility received a CAA inspection , which 
we top coded at 4 to reduce the impact of outliers. 
 We also controlled for whether a facility was certiﬁ ed to the 
ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Standard, 
which has been shown to improve regulatory compliance 
(Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler, 2000; Coglianese and Nash, 
2001b; Potoski and Prakash, 2005). We identiﬁ ed facilities 
that had been certiﬁ ed to ISO 14001 by 2004, using the World 
Preferred Database, and created  certiﬁ ed to ISO 14001 as a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 in all years after a facility was 
certiﬁ ed to the ISO 14001 standard, and 0 otherwise. 
 Changes in state-level enforcement capacity can inﬂ uence 
facility managers’ perceptions of deterrence strength, and 
thereby compliance behavior (Cohen, 2000; Shimshack and 
Ward, 2005; Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan, 2005). We 
developed two variables to capture variation in enforcement 
capacity within states over time. Using data from the U.S. 
EPA’s AIRS database, we calculated the  total Clean Air Act 
penalties that environmental regulators assessed in each 
state-year and the total number of  facilities regulated by the 
Clean Air Act in each state-year. 
 Model Speciﬁ cation 
 Our analysis estimated whether regulatory inspections were 
more likely to yield no violations (i.e., clean inspections) after 
facilities had indicated, through voluntary disclosure of a 
violation under the Audit Policy, that they had committed to 
self-regulate. We employed a conditional ﬁ xed effects logistic 
regression model to estimate the probability of a  clean inspec-
tion . In our model, the individual inspection was the unit of 
analysis. Because many facilities in our matched sample 
maintained uniformly clean compliance records during our 
sample period, the estimates generated by our conditional 
ﬁ xed-effects logistic models were based on a subset of our 
sample. Speciﬁ cally, our matched sample of 7,274 facilities 
included 6,442 facilities for which inspections were always 
“clean” and 832 facilities for which inspections were not 
always clean. The latter form the effective sample upon 
which our primary conditional ﬁ xed logistic models were 
estimated because these panel models are only identiﬁ ed for 
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facilities with variation in their dependent variable. As robust-
ness tests, we reestimated our speciﬁ cations as linear 
probability models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with 
facility ﬁ xed effects. Unlike our primary conditional ﬁ xed 
effects logistic models, this technique yields estimates that 
are based on the entire matched sample because OLS does 
not drop facilities that lack variation in the dependent variable. 
Although OLS presents considerable inference problems with 
dichotomous dependent variables, it has the advantage of 
retaining all perfectly predicted groups, thereby more accu-
rately estimating the effects of control variables. These OLS 
models yielded the same inferences as our conditional ﬁ xed 
effects logistic model. 
 We included in all models all of the variables described above 
as well as a series of seven dummy variables indicating each 
year before, during, or after the match year (i.e., one year 
before the match year, the match year, one year after the 
match year, and so on through ﬁ ve years after the match 
year). These additional dummy variables enabled us to control 
for temporal factors common to each match group, such as 
changes in presidential administrations, Congress, and EPA 
leadership, that might affect facility managers’ expectations 
about enforcement intensity. 
 We also included facility-level conditional ﬁ xed effects to 
control for time-invariant factors that might affect a facility’s 
compliance behavior, such as year of construction, EPA 
regional and state regulatory authorities, industry, proximity to 
the regulatory inspector, and political power and demographic 
characteristics of the local community (Gray and Deily, 1996; 
Helland, 1998; Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 2004; Gawande 
and Bohara, 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008). 
 We tested our hypotheses by estimating our model on 
subsets of the facilities about which we hypothesized, an 
approach used by many other organizational scholars (e.g., 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Zenger and Marshall, 2000; 
Simon, 2005; Xiao and Tsui, 2007) and in program evalua-
tions of voluntary environmental programs and educational 
policies (e.g., Bali and Alvarez, 2003; Brouhle, Grifﬁ ths, and 
Wolverton, 2009). To test H1, we estimated our model on 
the subsample of facilities (and their matched controls) that 
disclosed a violation to the Audit Policy without a direct 
regulatory threat, deﬁ ned as those facilities that were not 
targeted by a U.S. EPA Compliance Incentive Program in the 
disclosure (or match) year. As noted above, Compliance 
Incentive Programs encouraged facilities in particular EPA 
regions or industries that conducted speciﬁ c regulated 
activities to reexamine their compliance with a related 
regulatory issue and self-disclose and correct any violations 
they discovered. Letters from the regulator informing a 
facility that it had been targeted by a Compliance Incentive 
Program often contained an explicit warning that failure to 
conduct the review and disclose a violation put a facility at 
risk of being prioritized for scrutiny. We used Freedom of 
Information Act requests to obtain data from the U.S. EPA 
on the facilities targeted by its Compliance Incentive 
 Programs. 
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 To test H2, we estimated our model on the subset of facilities 
individually subjected to heavy regulatory monitoring—at least 
two inspections during the two years prior to the disclosure 
(or match) year. We constructed this subset based on CAA 
regulatory inspection data obtained from the U.S. EPA’s AIRS 
database. 
 To test H3, we estimated the model on a subset of facilities 
in heavily monitored industries, those subjected to above-
average levels of regulatory inspection. To identify this 
subset, we calculated inspection intensities as the average 
number of times a facility in each industry (2-digit SIC code) 
was inspected in each state and year, using facility industry 
identiﬁ ers from the agency’s Facility Registry System (FRS). 
We included facilities in industries with inspection intensities 
that exceeded the median industry inspection intensity level 
for its state-year, focusing on the year prior to each facility’s 
disclosure (or match) year. 
 We tested H4 by estimating our model on the subset of 
facilities that had superior compliance experience, which we 
operationalized as no compliance violations or enforcement 
actions in the year in which the facility disclosed to the Audit 
Policy or in either of the previous two years, and their 
matched controls. A record of three years with no compliance 
problems should constitute a reasonable threshold for con-
structing a subset of facilities with superior compliance 
histories. We obtained facilities’ compliance data from the 
U.S. EPA’s AIRS and ICIS databases. 
 RESULTS 
 Summary statistics and correlations for the entire matched 
sample are provided in table 2. Table 2 also reports summary 
statistics for the subset of the matched sample that exhibited 
variation in inspection outcomes during our sample period, 
which is the subsample on which the conditional ﬁ xed effects 
logistic estimates are based. The summary statistics between 
the entire matched sample and the subset used in the logistic 
regression model are similar. 
 We also calculated each facility’s total number of inspections 
that yielded at least one violation. These distributions are 
reported in table 3. The main difference between the two 
distributions is, as expected, that the subset used as the 
basis of the logistic model estimates excludes facilities that 
lacked variation in inspection outcomes (e.g., facilities for 
which inspections yielded no violations). 
 The results of the conditional ﬁ xed effects logistic regression 
models are provided in tables 4 and 5, where we report 
coefﬁ cients and clustered standard errors by facility to 
account for the non-independence of observations from the 
same facilities. To facilitate interpretation, we also report 
odds ratios (OR). 
 Regulatory threat . The results of the model that tested H1 
are reported as model 1 in table 4. The statistically signiﬁ cant 
positive coefﬁ cient on  disclosed indicates that facilities not 
facing a direct regulatory threat that disclosed to the Audit 
Policy, and in doing so committed to self-regulate, 
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Table 2
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Variable
Entire Matched Sample (N = 32,375 inspections)
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Inspection is “clean” (no violations) 
(dummy)
0.97 0.18 0 1
2. Disclosed (dummy) 0.04 0.20 0 1 −.02
3. Certiﬁ ed to ISO 14001 (dummy) 0.01 0.09 0 1 .00 .04
4. Years since last CAA inspection 1.58 0.99 1 4 −.02 −.04 −.01
5. Annual number of violations, lagged 
1 year
0.05 0.29 0 3 −.06 .04 .01 −.10
6. Log total CAA penalties in state-year 13.94 1.78 7.60 17.56 −.02 .06 .02 −.05 .08
7. Log number of CAA regulated facilities 
in state-year
7.45 0.67 4.06 8.29 .06 −.01 .01 −.10 −.00 .38
Variable
Matched Facilities 
with Variation in 
Inspection Outcomes 
(N = 6,150 inspections)*
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
1. Inspection is “clean” (no violations) 
(dummy)
0.83 0.38 0 1
2. Disclosed (dummy) 0.07 0.26 0 1
3. Certiﬁ ed to ISO 14001 (dummy) 0.01 0.11 0 1
4. Years since last CAA inspection 1.38 0.83 1 4
5. Annual number of violations, lagged 
1 year
0.26 0.61 0 3
6. Log total CAA penalties in state-year 14.19 1.56 8.16 17.56
7. Log number of CAA regulated facilities 
in state-year
7.35 0.65 4.08 8.29
* This is the subset of the matched sample of facilities with variation in inspection outcomes and is therefore 
 estimated via the primary conditional ﬁ xed effects logistic regression models.
Table 3
Count of Facilities in Sample
Number of a facility’s inspections that 
yielded at least one violation during the 
sample period
 Entire Matched Sample 
(N = 7,274 facilities)
Matched Facilities with Variation 
in Inspection Outcomes 
(N = 832 facilities)*
Number of 
facilities Percent
Number of 
facilities Percent
0 6,389 87.8 % – –
1 726 10.0 % 676 81.3 %
2 116 1.6 % 114 13.7 %
3 28 0.4 % 28 3.4 %
4 10 0.1 % 9 1.1 %
5 3 0.04 % 3 0.4 %
6 1 0.01 % 1 0.1 %
7 – – – –
8 1 0.01 % 1 0.1 %
* This is the subset of the matched sample of facilities with variation in inspection outcomes and is therefore 
 estimated via the primary conditional ﬁ xed effects logistic regression models.
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 subsequently improved the likelihood of clean inspections by 
a factor of 3.1 compared with their matched controls. This 
result supports H1, which predicted that disclosing without 
coercive pressure would be associated with subsequent 
improvements in regulatory compliance outcomes. 
 As a robustness test, we employed a more restrictive deﬁ ni-
tion to classify facilities as not being under regulatory threat. 
We further restricted this classiﬁ cation to facilities that were 
not targeted by a Compliance Incentive Program in the year 
they disclosed to the Audit Policy as well as in the year prior 
to their disclosure (and their matched controls). Estimating 
our model on this smaller sample of facilities yielded results 
( disclosed β = 1.11,  p < .01; OR = 3.0; N = 5311) nearly 
Table 4
Conditional Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Results*
Variable
Regulatory Threat Level Regulatory Surveillance: Facility-Level
Model 1 (low) H1 Model 2 (high) Model 3 (high) H2 Model 4 (low)
Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios
Disclosed 1.122•• 3.07 0.357 1.43 1.043•• 2.84 0.567 1.76
(0.327) (0.684) (0.334) (0.499)
Certiﬁ ed to ISO 14001 0.656 1.93 1.172 3.23 1.488 4.43 −0.275 0.76
(0.820) (1.678) (0.999) (1.034)
Number of years since 
last CAA inspection
0.205•• 1.23 0.614• 1.85 0.254 1.29 0.279•• 1.32
(0.055) (0.263) (0.155) (0.063)
Number of violations 
1 year ago
1.188•• 3.28 0.718• 2.05 0.867•• 2.38 1.443•• 4.24
(0.189) (0.333) (0.215) (0.237)
Number of violations 
2 years ago
1.182•• 3.26 1.075•• 2.93 0.858•• 2.36 1.609•• 5.00
(0.176) (0.348) (0.191) (0.271)
Log total CAA penalties 
in state-year
0.005 1.01 −0.349 0.71 −0.101 0.90 0.078 1.08
(0.050) (0.189) (0.068) (0.069)
Log number of CAA 
regulated facilities in 
state-year
−0.141 0.87 0.207 1.23 0.248 1.28 0.037 1.04
(0.463) (1.294) (0.563) (0.631)
1 year before match −0.552•• 0.58 −2.067• 0.13 −0.960•• 0.38 −0.017 0.98
(0.175) (0.854) (0.226) (0.394)
Match year −1.142•• 0.32 −2.691•• 0.07 −1.496•• 0.22 −0.658•• 0.52
(0.177) (0.877) (0.262) (0.247)
1 year after match −1.477•• 0.23 −3.001•• 0.05 −2.016•• 0.13 −0.837•• 0.43
(0.208) (0.803) (0.307) (0.251)
2 years after match −1.390•• 0.25 −3.816•• 0.02 −2.059•• 0.13 −0.811•• 0.45
(0.245) (0.852) (0.367) (0.285)
3 years after match −1.447•• 0.24 −3.718•• 0.02 −2.008•• 0.13 −0.938•• 0.39
(0.242) (0.826) (0.338) (0.303)
4 years after match −1.386•• 0.25 −3.114•• 0.04 −1.994•• 0.14 −0.691• 0.50
(0.258) (0.907) (0.376) (0.323)
5 years after match −1.048•• 0.35 −1.960 0.14 −1.981•• 0.14 0.006 1.01
(0.318) (1.129) (0.448) (0.412)
Observations 
(inspections)
5,372 778 3,610 2,540
Firms 766 66 338 494
• p < .05; •• p < .01.
* Robust standard errors, clustered by facility, are in parentheses.
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Model 1: Low regulatory threat [H1]
Model 2: High regulatory threat
Model 3: High facility-level regulatory surveillance [H2]
Model 4: Low facility-level regulatory surveillance
Model 5: High industry-level regulatory surveillance [H3]
Model 6: Low industry-level regulatory surveillance
Model 7: Superior facility compliance experience [H4]
Model 8: Inferior facility compliance experience
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 1. Conﬁ dence intervals of difference in difference estimates.*
*This ﬁ gure depicts the 5% to 95% conﬁ dence intervals of the disclosed coefﬁ cients from the models 
 presented in tables 4 and 5.
 identical to those generated by our primary model, reported 
as model 1 in table 4. 
 For completeness, we report as model 2 the results of the 
opposite subsample about which we did not hypothesize: 
facilities that self-disclosed to the Audit Policy in a year in 
which they  were targeted by a Compliance Incentive Pro-
gram (and their matched controls). In contrast to our earlier 
results, the odds ratio on  disclosed is close to 1 and not 
statistically signiﬁ cant, indicating that facilities that disclosed 
while facing an enforcement threat subsequently exhibited 
compliance records that were indistinguishable from their 
matched controls. Figure 1 depicts the 5 percent to 95 
percent conﬁ dence intervals of the disclosed coefﬁ cient for 
each of these models as well as all other models reported in 
tables 4 and 5. 
 Regulatory surveillance. In model 3, the positive, statisti-
cally signiﬁ cant coefﬁ cient on  disclosed indicates that 
among more heavily inspected facilities, those that disclosed 
and committed to self-regulate substantially improved their 
compliance records by a factor of 2.8 compared with their 
matched controls. This ﬁ nding supports H2, which predicted 
that heavily monitored facilities would implement their 
commitments to self-regulate in ways that would improve 
compliance. Again, for completeness, we report, as model 
4, results for the unhypothesized subsample of less heavily 
inspected facilities, those inspected at most once during the 
two years prior to their disclosure or match year. The compli-
ance records of these less heavily monitored facilities 
remained statistically indistinguishable from those of their 
matched controls. 
 The results of the model testing H3 are reported as model 5 
in table 5. The positive, statistically signiﬁ cant coefﬁ cient on 
 disclosed indicates that among facilities in more heavily 
inspected industries, those that disclosed to the Audit Policy 
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and committed to self-regulate substantially improved their 
compliance records compared with their matched controls. 
The odds ratio of 13 indicates that inspections among facili-
ties in more heavily inspected industries that disclosed to the 
Audit Policy increased from a baseline of 69.0 percent clean 
(average  clean inspection prior to disclosure) to a predicted 
96.7 percent probability after disclosing under the Audit 
Policy. This ﬁ nding supports our contention in H3 that in more 
heavily monitored industries, disclosing facilities would 
meaningfully implement their commitments to self-regulate 
and would therefore realize improved compliance records 
relative to those of their matched controls. For completeness, 
we also estimated the model on the opposite subset about 
which we did not hypothesize, facilities in less heavily 
Table 5
Conditional Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Results*
Variable
Regulatory Surveillance: Industry-Level Facility Compliance Experience
Model 5 (high) H3 Model 6 (low) Model 7 (superior) H4 Model 8 (inferior)
Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios Coefﬁ cients
Odds 
ratios
Disclosed 2.563•• 12.97 0.581 1.79 0.996 2.71 −1.140•• 0.32
(0.883) (0.299) (0.680) (0.332)
Certiﬁ ed to ISO 14001 2.222 9.23 0.394 1.48 0.116 1.12 0.189 1.21
(2.095) (0.831) (1.040) (1.069)
Number of years since 
last CAA inspection
0.324•• 1.38 0.160• 1.17 0.242•• 1.27 0.089 1.09
(0.108) (0.066) (0.070) (0.115)
Number of violations 
1 year ago
1.753•• 5.77 0.969•• 2.64 1.701•• 5.48 0.484• 1.62
(0.358) (0.193) (0.250) (0.231)
Number of violations 
2 years ago
1.525•• 4.60 1.067•• 2.91 1.772•• 5.88 0.516•• 1.68
(0.431) (0.182) (0.252) (0.164)
Log total CAA penalties 
in state-year
−0.127 0.88 0.005 1.01 −0.033 0.97 −0.040 0.96
(0.099) (0.054) (0.067) (0.085)
Log number of CAA 
regulated facilities 
in state-year
0.136 1.15 −0.120 0.89 −1.283 0.28 1.617• 5.04
(1.243) (0.447) (0.703) (0.650)
1 year before match 0.953• 2.59 −0.878•• 0.42 −0.844• 0.43 −0.611•• 0.54
(0.476) (0.191) (0.425) (0.193)
Match year −0.586 0.56 −1.363•• 0.26 −2.269•• 0.10 −0.814•• 0.44
(0.397) (0.199) (0.413) (0.234)
1 year after match −0.671 0.51 −1.733•• 0.18 −3.367•• 0.04 0.754• 2.13
(0.440) (0.232) (0.429) (0.303)
2 years after match −1.024 0.36 −1.613•• 0.20 −3.506•• 0.03 0.968•• 2.63
(0.542) (0.261) (0.460) (0.361)
3 years after match −1.068• 0.34 −1.688•• 0.19 −3.772•• 0.02 1.352•• 3.86
(0.534) (0.262) (0.475) (0.348)
4 years after match −0.633 0.53 −1.633•• 0.20 −3.619•• 0.03 1.394•• 4.03
(0.555) (0.277) (0.484) (0.443)
5 years after match −1.113 0.33 −0.958•• 0.38 −3.238•• 0.04 2.119•• 8.33
(0.628) (0.344) (0.513) (0.645)
Observations 
(inspections)
963 5,187 3,952 2,198
Firms 190 642 582 250
• p < .05; •• p < .01.
* Robust standard errors, clustered by facility, are in parentheses.
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 monitored industries (those with inspection intensities below 
the median for their state in the year prior to the disclosure or 
match year). The results of model 6 indicate a smaller 
improvement among these self-disclosers, signiﬁ cant only at 
the 10-percent level. A Wald test indicated that the relative 
improvement among disclosers in heavily monitored indus-
tries exceeded the relative improvement among disclosers in 
less scrutinized industries (Wald χ 2 = 4.54;  p = .03). 
 Regulatory experience . Model 7 tests H4. As noted earlier, 
this model is estimated on the subsample of facilities that had 
superior compliance experiences, deﬁ ned as no compliance 
violations or enforcement actions in the adoption (or match) 
year or in either of the previous two years. The odds ratio on 
 disclosed is positive, as predicted, but not statistically signiﬁ -
cant. This ﬁ nding does not support H4, which predicted that 
among facilities with superior compliance histories, disclosing 
facilities would be more likely than their matched controls to 
maintain perfect compliance records. The odds ratio being 
large in magnitude (2.71) but not statistically signiﬁ cant 
suggests the possibility that a substantively important effect 
might be cloaked by an imprecise estimate, warranting further 
research. 
 One interesting ﬁ nding is derived from the opposite subset 
of facilities about which we did not hypothesize, those with 
at least one compliance violation or enforcement action in 
the adoption year or either of the two preceding years. 
Among this subset of inferior compliers, the statistically 
signiﬁ cant negative coefﬁ cient on  disclosed in model 8, 
properly interpreted in conjunction with the large odds ratios 
on the post-match year counters (ranging from 2.1 to 8.5), 
indicates that disclosing facilities subsequently improved 
their compliance at a slower pace than their matched 
controls. 
 Statistical power and subgroup analysis. A potential 
concern associated with subgroup (subsample) analysis of 
multiple subgroups relates to statistical inference. Because 
four subgroup analyses were performed at the 5-percent 
signiﬁ cance level, the probability that at least one of these 
analyses would be statistically signiﬁ cant simply by chance 
was 0.19 (calculated as 1 – 0.95^4, assuming independence 
between tests). We can decrease the odds of a false positive 
by increasing the threshold for inference to the 1-percent 
signiﬁ cance level, in which case the probability of at least one 
of the four tests being statistically signiﬁ cant by chance falls 
to just 0.04 (calculated as 1 – 0.99^4, assuming indepen-
dence between tests). In fact, the three hypotheses for which 
we found statistical support were each signiﬁ cant at the 
1-percent level, indicating that our results are robust to this 
potential risk of false positives from multiple subgroup 
analysis tests. 
 Additional results and extensions . An additional ﬁ nding 
worth noting is the relationship between facilities’ compliance 
experience and their compliance outcomes in the subsequent 
year. Our results provided consistent evidence that facilities 
previously cited for violations were especially likely to improve 
future compliance. Speciﬁ cally, the odds ratios on the lagged 
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counts of prior CAA violations were consistently positive and 
statistically signiﬁ cant across all regression models reported 
in tables 4 and 5. These results are consistent with those 
from another study that found steel facilities with recent 
enforcement actions to be especially likely to comply with 
Clean Air Act regulations going forward (Gray and Deily, 
1996). 
 Our main results are presented above for each of our four 
focal groups individually. But because surveillance and direct 
threats might often occur together, we explored whether 
highly monitored disclosers would signiﬁ cantly improve their 
compliance records even in the absence of regulatory threats. 
To test this, we identiﬁ ed the group of disclosers that were 
highly monitored (pursuant to H2)  and not subjected to a 
Compliance Incentive Program in the adoption year (pursuant 
to H1) and their matched controls. Estimating our model on 
this smaller subset (N = 3018 inspections) yielded results 
( disclosed β = 1.29;  p < .01; OR = 3.6) similar to our main 
results from testing H1 and H2. This indicates that among 
facilities subjected to high regulatory surveillance, disclosers 
subsequently improved their compliance records compared 
with their matched controls and that this difference in 
improvement rates persisted even among the subset of 
highly monitored disclosers and matched controls that did not 
face regulatory threats. 
 DISCUSSION 
 The ﬁ ndings of this study suggest that the enforcement 
strategies and relationships of the legal environment play an 
important role in moderating organizations’ implementation 
of their commitments to self-regulate. Facilities  not facing 
regulatory threats that disclosed regulatory violations and 
committed to self-regulate exhibited improved regulatory 
outcomes. This supports the notion that a weak regulatory 
state can exert a peculiar normative strength (Dobbin and 
Sutton, 1998). In contrast, facilities that disclosed while 
facing regulatory threats did not improve their regulatory 
outcomes compared with their matched controls, suggest-
ing that bald displays of coercive power by the state can 
undermine more normatively based motivations to 
self-regulate (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Tenbrunsel and 
 Messick, 1999). 
 Nevertheless, our ﬁ ndings also demonstrate that the state 
need not, and should not, abdicate its role as regulatory 
enforcer, as some have suggested (Klein, 1997; U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2005). Although our 
ﬁ ndings suggest that direct regulatory threats impede 
successful implementation of self-regulation commitments, 
we demonstrate that high levels of regulatory surveillance 
at both the ﬁ eld and organizational levels promote the 
implementation of self-regulation. Unlike sanctions and 
threats, surveillance does not appear to dampen normative 
motivations and thus can be an effective tool not only for 
deterring harmful behavior but also for enhancing the 
self-regulatory performance of  regulated organizations. Our 
extension further suggests that surveillance improves 
outcomes even when it is not  accompanied by a direct 
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threat. Of course, surveillance in a complex regulatory 
scheme like the one we analyzed always occurs against a 
general background threat of sanctions. What we demon-
strate is that, for the purpose of fostering organizations’ 
self-regulating capacities, threats of punishment are better 
left in the background. 
 Consistent with concerns others have raised about the hollow 
nature of commitments to self-regulate (Edelman, Erlanger, 
and Lande, 1993; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001), our 
ﬁ ndings on organizations’ experience with regulatory compli-
ance counsel caution in relying on self-regulation to realize 
regulatory goals. We found that among facilities with poor 
compliance histories, those that disclosed violations subse-
quently realized slower improvements in regulatory outcomes 
than their non-disclosing counterparts. This suggests that, 
among poor compliers, self-regulation might be symbolically 
adopted more “as window dressing to deﬂ ect attention and 
or culpability resulting from illegal actions” (McKendall, 
DeMarr, and Jones-Rikkers, 2002: 367) than as a tool for 
improving compliance practices. 
 In addition to theorizing about and testing the conditions 
that moderate organizations’ ability to follow through on 
commitments to self-regulate, we make ﬁ ve key contribu-
tions to the literature. First, we put the institutional litera-
ture into a productive dialogue with scholarship on 
self-regulation. As Vaughan (1990: 230) noted, “[w]hile 
empirical and theoretical work on the external control of 
organizations is extensive, we know much less about the 
organizational dimensions of self-regulation.” We seek to 
begin building a body of theoretical and empirical knowl-
edge about organizational self-regulation by identifying 
some of the conditions under which self-regulatory struc-
tures are integrated into organizational life in ways that can 
achieve regulatory goals. 
 Second, we add momentum to a recent movement to shift 
scholarship on law and organizations into the realm of out-
comes (e.g., Kalev, Kelly, and Dobbin, 2006; Schneiberg and 
Bartley, 2008; Hirsch, 2009), where it can address important 
questions about the extent to which formal organizational 
responses to regulation are truly transformative rather than 
symbolic or ceremonial (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). There 
are a number of reasons why scholarship in this area has not 
focused on the effects of self-regulatory structures. In part, 
this gap in the literature is an artifact of important theoretical 
concerns with the adoption, diffusion, and legitimacy of 
organizational structures that ﬂ ow from the institutional 
orientation of existing scholarship. In part, the gap springs 
from a desire to move law and society scholarship beyond 
simple measurements of the distinction between formal law, 
or law on the books, and legal outcomes, or law in action, 
toward a more complicated understanding of the processes 
by which both law and legal outcomes are constructed. And, 
in part, the paucity of research on the effects of self-regula-
tory structures springs from the difﬁ culty of obtaining data on 
both the existence of internal compliance structures and the 
outcomes they produce. All of these factors tend to “sideline 
issues of implementation, effectiveness, and local impact” 
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(Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008: 49). Yet if internal compliance 
structures are mediating institutions, as prior research has 
demonstrated, they have also become (or at least purport to 
be) full-ﬂ edged regulatory institutions that have been inte-
grated deeply into contemporary regulatory regimes, including 
those that failed to prevent recent ﬁ nancial and environmental 
catastrophes. This development demands scholarship that 
addresses how these structures affect the regulatory 
 behavior of the organizations that adopt them. 
 Third, we expand prevailing conceptions of the legal environ-
ment. Despite the centrality of the legal environment to 
theorizing about law and organizations, the construct is 
surprisingly under-theorized and under-socialized in the 
literature. Institutional studies of internal compliance struc-
tures have uniformly posited that organizations adopt them 
symbolically, in response to external pressures in the legal 
environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Edelman, 1990; 
Sutton et al., 1994; Kalev, Kelly, and Dobbin, 2006). But 
although law is identiﬁ ed as a key environmental factor 
prompting the adoption of symbolic structures and proce-
dures, it is portrayed in these studies as a disembodied, 
abstract, and undifferentiated force. This literature attends 
to how the organizational response to legal mandates 
mediates the meaning of compliance but ignores how 
variation in the implementation of those legal mandates 
might mediate the nature of the organizational response. 
Socio-legal scholarship demonstrates that even the most 
formal legal mandates are implemented through a complex 
network of relationships between regulators and regulated 
entities (Hawkins, 1984; McAllister, 2007). Our study 
indicates that the nature of these relationships inﬂ uences 
the way regulated entities understand and respond to their 
legal environments and that this will, in turn, inﬂ uence the 
extent to which they integrate certain  regulatory goals and 
ideals into their organizational practices. 
 Fourth, we demonstrate that there are important distinctions 
between the effects of sanctions and surveillance on organi-
zational behavior that are not fully captured by either deter-
rence theory or the organizational literature on social control 
and cooperation. Although coercive regulatory threats appear 
to have dampened intrinsic motivations to self-regulate, 
surveillance had the opposite effect. Disclosing facilities in 
heavily monitored industries were more likely than those in 
less monitored industries to follow through on their commit-
ments to self-regulate. Furthermore, even direct surveillance 
of individual facilities promoted effective implementation of 
self-regulation. We theorized this distinction to be due partly 
to a cuing or framing effect that accompanies threats of 
sanctions, but not routine surveillance, and partly to distinc-
tions between individuals and organizations that are not fully 
ﬂ eshed out in the existing literature. For instance, whereas 
individual employees may view surveillance of their activities 
as “oppositional” (Langevoort, 2002: 96), employees who 
work in an organization’s compliance group may see surveil-
lance of the company’s compliance activities as empowering 
and supportive of what they do (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). 
Surveillance may also provide a critical mechanism for 
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 validating organizational commitments to self-regulate. To 
establish cooperative or socially responsible behavior in 
competitive marketplaces, organizations must be able to 
make credible commitments and read the commitment levels 
of others (Frank, 1996; Campbell, 2007). Surveillance can help 
solve this commitment problem (Frank, 1996) by validating 
the efforts of successful self-regulators and distinguishing 
them from other ﬁ rms. Though this study provides a frame-
work for thinking about these issues, further research is 
needed to determine the extent to which the distinction we 
have identiﬁ ed between sanctions and surveillance holds 
more broadly. 
 Finally, we introduce possibilities for agency into institutional 
accounts from which agents have been largely lacking 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2001). Our ﬁ ndings demonstrate 
that effective self-regulation is a product not only of structural 
conditions in organizations and environments but of what 
regulators do. This has important practical and theoretical 
implications. As a practical matter, our ﬁ ndings provide tools 
that regulators can use to implement enforcement schemes 
that seek to leverage the self-regulating capacities of regu-
lated organizations. As a theoretical matter, this approach 
helps to bridge organizational literatures on internal compli-
ance structures, social control of individuals, and social control 
of organizations that have much to learn from one another. As 
regulators increasingly turn to voluntary and cooperative 
strategies to achieve regulatory goals, these bodies of 
scholarship can provide key insights into the mix of incentives 
and normative motivations that will most effectively shape 
organizational behavior. 
 Limitations and Future Research 
 Our study has a number of limitations but also reveals several 
promising areas for future research. First, our dependent 
variable is mediated by the regulatory inspectors who cite 
violations and thus reﬂ ects the perceptions, cognitive biases, 
professional commitments, and relationships they bring to the 
task (Hawkins, 1984; McAllister, 2007). Nevertheless, we 
have reason to believe that these mediating factors do not 
impinge on our conclusions here. First, structurally, the EPA 
strictly segregates its ofﬁ ce for voluntary programs from its 
ﬁ eld inspection operations to avoid any actual or apparent 
conﬂ ict of interest. Second, our interviews with individual 
inspectors revealed strong evidence against there being any 
systematic bias in favor of (or against) voluntary disclosers. 
Some inspectors reported that they did not even know 
whether the facilities they inspected were voluntary disclos-
ers or not, and those that did know said that this knowledge 
had no impact on the way they conducted their inspections. 
An inspector with comparatively broad experience inspecting 
voluntary disclosers reported that, in his view, self-policing 
produced mixed results and thus necessitated ongoing 
scrutiny. Discussing the quality of compliance auditing by 
voluntary disclosers, he said, “It really varies. I’ve seen 
companies that took it to heart, but it didn’t affect how we 
inspect them, and I’ve seen companies where they say, 
‘We’re part of all these programs,’ and found a lot of viola-
tions” (interview transcript #1, 2009). As another inspector 
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put it, “We look at everything and it makes no difference one 
way or the other” (interview transcript #5, 2009). Thus, 
although we cannot rule out the possibility that bias of one 
kind or another exists among inspectors, we are conﬁ dent 
that it is neither prevalent nor systematic enough to 
 undermine our conclusions. 
 Second, our ﬁ ndings on regulatory threats speak to the issue 
of regulatory style rather than to the optimal magnitude of 
penalties. For instance, it is possible that the prospect of very 
high penalties would provide sufﬁ cient extrinsic motivation for 
organizations to comply, obviating concerns about the effect 
of penalties or punitive style on other kinds of motivations. 
We could not address this issue because our models did not 
incorporate data on the size of penalties. Incorporating such 
data and modeling the effects of penalty magnitude on 
intrinsic motivations and the effective implementation of 
self-regulation are important projects for future research. But 
there are signiﬁ cant social and political constraints on the size 
of penalties, limiting regulators’ practical ability to impose 
optimal ﬁ nes for undesirable behavior. This certainly is the 
case in the U.S. environmental context (our research setting), 
where potential penalties are quite small relative to the 
potential beneﬁ ts that regulated ﬁ rms can reap from violating 
the law. These practical realities highlight the importance of 
our project, because the success of any regulatory scheme in 
which penalties are constrained will depend largely on the 
extent to which it can cultivate a sufﬁ cient level of “self- 
motivation to obey the law” (Ackerloff and Dickens, 
1982: 318). 
 Another potential limitation relates to our methodology. 
Although applying a difference-in-differences approach to a 
matched sample is viewed as a robust approach to program 
evaluation and has been used in many empirical studies, this 
approach does not explicitly correct for selection on unobserv-
ables. To the extent that unobservables are ﬁ xed over time, 
they are absorbed by the facility-level conditional ﬁ xed effects 
included in our regression speciﬁ cations. Despite our match-
ing on several factors that prior research has shown to 
determine Audit Policy adoption, as in all studies that rely on 
matching on observables, a hidden bias might remain in our 
estimates if unobservable, facility-level, time-varying shocks 
occur that are correlated with a facility’s disclosure decision 
and compliance outcomes. To affect the inferences from our 
analysis, however, this would have had to occur dispropor-
tionately among the disclosers or the matched non- disclosers 
group. We have no reason to suspect that this concern 
seriously biases our results, but we acknowledge that it is a 
possibility. 
 Many questions remain for future research. First, although 
we have identiﬁ ed a number of conditions that contribute 
to the meaningful implementation of self-regulation, more 
work must be done to ﬂ esh out other organizational and 
environmental determinants. Such work should attend not 
only to the ﬁ xed and structural characteristics of organiza-
tions and their environments but to dynamic conditions 
created by social actors that create the legal environment 
in which organizations operate. Second, our ﬁ nding that 
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surveillance promotes effective self-regulation suggests 
the need for a more ﬁ ne-grained analysis of different 
regulatory tools to examine their varying impacts on 
organizations’ normative motivations. The regulatory tool 
kit has been expanding in recent years, and this demands 
both theoretical and empirical reconsideration of the 
relationship between different tools of social control and 
the intrinsic or normative motivations of their objects. 
Third, our ﬁ ndings suggest the need for a more explicit 
dialogue between the literatures on the social control of 
individuals within organizations and the legal control of 
organizations by regulators. We demonstrate here that 
theoretical insights from the former can predict outcomes 
in the latter, but a more sustained analysis of the relation-
ship between the two is needed. 
 Finally, future research is needed to better understand the 
relationship between ﬁ rms’ poor past performance and their 
ability to effectively implement self-regulation. The most 
signiﬁ cant limitation of self-regulatory structures that we 
identiﬁ ed is their implementation at facilities with historically 
poor compliance performance. Facilities among this subset that 
voluntarily disclosed and committed to self-regulate improved 
more slowly than their non-disclosing counterparts. In this 
context, the adoption of self-regulatory structures appears to 
have retarded rather than accelerated compliance improvement, 
suggesting that self-regulation may not be an appropriate tool 
for reforming historically poor compliers. Self-regulatory tech-
nologies could be of more limited value if they prove incapable 
of transforming the practices of  struggling organizations. 
Commitment to Self-Regulate
 Many have argued that activating the self-regulating capaci-
ties of organizations is critical to maintaining legal compliance 
and achieving social goals in increasingly complex national 
and international regulatory regimes (e.g., Ayres and 
 Braithwaite, 1992; Orts, 1995; Murray, 1999; Lobel, 2005). 
Our analysis suggests both the possibilities and the limita-
tions of this approach to regulation. Although the self- 
regulatory commitments of some Audit Policy disclosers 
appear to have been merely symbolic, others appear to have 
followed through on their commitments to self-regulate, 
exhibiting improved compliance outcomes and suggesting 
that these organizations institutionalized the self-regulatory 
structures they pledged to adopt. We demonstrated that the 
nature and amount of regulatory pressure applied to regulated 
organizations, as well as the experience of these organiza-
tions in navigating their regulatory environments, affects the 
likelihood that they will follow through on their commitments 
to self-regulate. We showed that high levels of regulatory 
surveillance, at both the ﬁ eld and organizational levels, 
promote successful implementation of commitments to 
self-regulate, as does an enforcement posture that avoids 
direct regulatory threats. Self-regulation is not a one-size-
ﬁ ts-all solution, but it can play an important role in promoting 
compliance, especially when regulatory agents shape the 
legal environment in ways that encourage organizations to 
make good on their pledges to self-regulate. 
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